
Iran-Contra Affair
Undersatnding the Iran-contra affair and it's influence on
U.S. foreign affairs and on popular U.S. street opinion of
Nicaragua is important. Nicaragua's reputation as a
tourism destination is just starting to recover from this
unfortunate crossroads in history. What was the Iran-
contra affair?
The Iran-contra affair was a secret arrangement in
the 1980s to provide funds to the Nicaraguan contra
rebels from profits gained by selling arms to Iran. The
Iran-contra affair was the product of two separate
initiatives during the administration of President Ronald
Reagan. The first was a commitment to aid the contras
who were conducting a guerrilla war against the
Sandinista government of Nicaragua. The second was to
placate "moderates" within the Iranian government in
order to secure the release of American hostages held
by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon and to influence Iranian
foreign policy in a pro-Western direction.
Despite the strong opposition of the Reagan
administration, the Democratic-controlled Congress
enacted legislation, known as the Boland amendments,
that prohibited the Defence Dept., the CIA, or any other
government agency from providing military aid to the
contras from Dec., 1983, to Sept., 1985. The Reagan
administration circumvented these limitations by using
the National Security Council (NSC), which was not
explicitly covered by the law, to supervise covert
military aid to the contras. Under Robert McFarlane
(1983-85) and John Poindexter (1985-86) the NSC raised
private and foreign funds for the contras. This operation
was directed by NSC staffer Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North.
McFarlane and North were also the central figures in the
plan to secretly ship arms to Iran despite a U.S. trade and
arms embargo.
In early Nov., 1986, the scandal broke when reports in
Lebanese newspapers forced the Reagan administration
to disclose the arms deals. Poindexter resigned before
the end of the month; North was fired. Select
congressional committees held joint hearings, and in
Dec., 1986, Lawrence E. Walsh was named as special
prosecuter to investigate the affair. Higher administration
officials, particulary Reagan, Vice President Bush, and late
William J. Casey (former director of the FBI), were
implicated in some testimony, but the extent of their
involvement remained unclear. North said he believed
Reagan was largely aware of the secret arrangement, and the
independent prosecutor's report (1994) said that Reagan
and Bush had some knowledge of the affair, and no evidence
was found to link them to any crime. A presidential
commission was critical of the NSC, while congressional
hearings uncovered a web of official deception,
mismanagement, and illegality.
A number of criminal convictions resulted, including those
of McFarlane, North and Poindexte, but North and Poindexter's
were vacated on appeal because of immunity agreements
with the Senate concerning their testimony. Former State
Dept. and CIA officials pleaded guilty in 1991 to withholding
information about the contra aid from Congress, and Caspar
Weinberger, defence secretary under Reagan, was charged
(1992) with the same offence. In 1992 then-president Bush
pardoned Weinberger and other officials who had been indicted
or convicted for withholding information on or obstructing
investigation of the affair. The Iran-contra affair raised serious
questions about the nature and scope of congressional
oversight of foreign affairs and the limits of the executive
branch.




